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This thesis traces the legitimization question that has plagued the Communist Party of China 
(CCP) since inception. Drawing inspiration from Weber’s three types of legitimacy, the narrative 
established by this paper describes the establishment of the CCP’s founding ideology and 
policies under Mao in the vein of charismatic-ideological legitimization and its role in birthing 
the economic-performance legitimization dogma that dominated the several decades preceding 
the Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping-led administrations. This thesis then argues that social issues, 
byproducts of the economic-performance legitimization system, incubated the CCP’s current 
moral-ideological legitimization strategy. By following the legitimization narrative, this thesis 
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Under every step taken by the Communist Party of China (“CCP”) lurks a potential 
political legitimacy landmine. The fall of the Soviet Union aggravated questions regarding the 
sustainability of nondemocratic political systems. Western scholarship has long debated the 
longevity of the CCP, assuming that any government based on nondemocratic values is 
inherently illegitimate. In the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen tragedy, Western academics began 
counting down the days until the CCP’s imminent collapse, citing authoritarianism as the 
antithesis of long-term political legitimacy. However, not all Western scholars study China to 
predict the precise time of government apocalypse. Holbig and Gilley, Western co-authors on 
many oft-cited legitimacy studies, approach with a more sympathetic view, arguing that China’s 
government legitimacy, under any government structure, is subject to “serious legitimacy 
fissures if only because of its size and complexity”, preferring to view legitimization pains as a 
historical motif (Holbig & Gilley, 2010, p. 399).  
While China watchers generated a steady stream of thought leadership on Chinese 
legitimization dating back to the establishment of the CCP, recent CCP administrations tacitly 
allowed the proliferation of academic research within both CCP schools and non-state-controlled 
universities on the subject of political legitimacy, considered a subversive topic area in years past  
(Holbig & Gilley, 2010; Zhang, 2013;  Buckley, 2013). At the Party and the World Dialogue 
2015, Wang Qishan, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, directly referenced the 
source of CCP legitimacy (Ruan, 2015). The lack of absolute censorship over the topic of 
legitimacy reveals the current CCP administration’s self-perspective. As with the generations of 
leadership that followed Mao, the current regime pragmatically treats political legitimacy as a 
living, changeable quality that requires strategic nurture. The CCP, no longer led by an 
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ideological figurehead and unable to revert to the level of authoritarianism seen during the 
Cultural Revolution, is augmenting its efforts to reinvigorate and redefine its political legitimacy. 
The CCP’s surprising willingness to address the legitimacy problem within the semi-public 
sphere of academia signals a waxing commitment towards tackling the elephant in the room. 
A Brief Note on Political Legitimacy 
Political legitimacy by itself is a term defined vaguely and often tinged with democratic 
bias. Few modern discussions of political legitimacy can do without a brief introduction to the 
theories of Max Weber. Weber, a German sociologist, became a familiar name in the study of 
political phenomena following the publication of his essay, The Three Types of Legitimate Rule, 
in 1922. He distills political legitimacy into three Platonic types: legal-rational, traditional, and 
charismatic (Weber & Whimster, 2004, pp.133-138).  
Weber’s perspective on his three types of legitimacy is similar to that of color theory. The 
three pure forms act like the three primary colors and can be mixed in varying capacities to 
express a rainbow of shades. Legal-rational legitimacy is “based upon belief in the authority of 
rules which have been established by the formally correct procedures”; individual authority plays 
a minimal role in this form for individual leaders are accepted so long as authoritative laws are 
followed (Beetham, 1991, p. 36). In contrast, traditional and charismatic legitimacy “are forms of 
personal authority”, as traditional legitimacy finds its basis in traditional norms and charismatic 
legitimacy hinges upon the extraordinary characteristics of individual leaders (Beetham, 1991, p. 
36).  
Ever since Weber propagated his legitimacy types, his work been critiqued and modified 
to no end. David Beetham finds fault in the three types because they are both antecedents and 
descendants of each other (Beetham, 1991, p. 39). Various riffs on the Weberian forms have 
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emerged, particularly in reference to authoritarian governments. Allen Buchanan distinguishes 
between political legitimacy, political authority, and authoritativeness, imposing an additional 
criterion of moral justification to satisfy legitimacy (Buchanan, 2002, p. 689). A more practical 
approach to political legitimacy can be found in Bruce Gilley’s cross-national hypothesis-testing 
on significant variables influencing citizen perception of legitimacy. Gilley defines legitimacy on 
the basis that “a state is more legitimate the more that it is treated by its citizens as rightfully 
holding and exercising political power”, building a case of perception-based legitimacy 
evaluation (Gilley, 2006, p. 48).  Following a thorough review of over 65 academic studies, 
Gilley identifies welfare gains (income, life satisfaction, social equality, national pride, political 
engagement) and political justice (control of corruption, rule of law, effective bureaucracy) as 
key sources of political legitimacy (Gilley, 2006, pp. 49-52). Gilley’s regression model supports 
the identified variables and he attributes high levels of legitimacy to “good performance” 
(namely, high income levels) (Gilley, 2006, p. 60).  
Purpose of Thesis 
The positive assessment of performance legitimization produced by Gilley’s work returns 
the discussion of political legitimacy to the CCP. Western observers tend to categorize the CCP’s 
strategy as that of economic performance legitimacy. David Shambaugh, one of the top three 
most-cited Western academics on the topic of Chinese political legitimacy, warned of “the 
coming Chinese crackup” and lambasting Xi Jinping in a Wall Street Journal opinion-editorial in 
March 2016, prompting surprise from long-time readers given Shambaugh’s general reputation 
as a cautious, moderate China scholar (Wade, 2015). As warning signs of economic and social 
stability come knocking, a renewed wave of naysayers have emerged, questioning the longevity 
of the CCP.  
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Xi Jinping, the leader of the CCP since 2012, is a quandary China watchers love to 
unpick. Early coverage of Xi Jinping in 2012 invoked folksy human interest language, describing 
Xi Jinping’s “affable” personality (Branigan, 2012). Over time, Western news sources began to 
betray a distinct unease, as Xi Jinping’s leaked directives1 take aim at Western ideals (Buckley, 
2013). Now, images of Mao and Xi are paired, as journalists draw parallels between Mao’s 
Cultural Revolution and Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream” (Browne, 2013). One unflattering Wall 
Street Journal article was published just days after reports revealed that authorities were actively 
trying to stem Xi Jinping’s growing personality cult by blocking Xi’s hometown nickname from 
publication in the media (Wong, 2016). Xi Jinping’s reformist orientation, coupled with his 
Maoist tendencies, prompted the Brooking Institution to ask, “What does China really want?” 
(Bader, 2016). 
This thesis seeks to explain the major initiatives introduced under Xi Jinping as a 
continuation of, rather than a break from, the CCP’s ongoing endeavor to establish political 
legitimacy. This thesis argues that the ideological legitimization strategy of Mao created social 
problems that required the development of economic-performance legitimization under the CCP 
administrations that followed his death. Accordingly, Xi Jinping’s administration has inherited 
its own set of social problems created by the economic-performance legitimization strategy of 
post-Mao leadership, which it seeks to resolve by adopting a moral-ideological legitimization 
strategy. 
Discussion Roadmap 
The first chapter of this thesis will cover the historical background of the CCP, 
particularly the basis of core CCP ideology and Mao’s cult of personality. In the second chapter, 
                                                          
1 Known as Document No. 9 
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a broad overview of the economic-performance legitimization from the time of market reform to 
the early 2000s. The chapter will discuss the need for performance legitimization in the 
immediate post-Mao era as well as the multitude of social problems that emerged in the 
implementation of the strategy. The third and final chapter discusses the near-term approach the 
Xi Jinping administration has taken to address the CCP’s top social priorities and the long-term 
crusade the CCP has sanctioned to claim a uniquely Chinese legacy. A case study on the Three 
Gorges Dam will illustrate the contrast between the CCP’s legitimization strategies regarding the 
same project. Finally, this thesis will summarize the findings of all three chapters to arrive at a 
unified theory for explaining CCP legitimization activity.  
Critically, this thesis does not masquerade as a comprehensive approach to the question 
of Chinese political legitimacy. Political affairs cannot be explained by one theory, nor can the 
true story of over half a century of human drama and political intrigue be covered in the span of 
a double-digit number of pages. Ideally, this thesis will present a view on CCP political activity 





Official Framing  
This thesis utilizes a means-based approach towards interpreting political legitimization 
strategy. Rather than evaluating the success or failure of the current CCP in achieving political 
goals, this thesis studies the “official framing” espoused by the central government. The ends of 
legitimization strategies are hard to gauge until long after strategy implementation. Not only that, 
the intended strategy may not achieve its desired effect. For example, “[differentiating] whether 
one who is not politically active rejects the legitimacy of the political authority [is difficult]. 
[After all, it] is in time of crisis, such as a revolution or an invasion, that the rejection of an 
authority’s legitimacy manifests itself…for example, [the] Iraqi army during the Second Gulf 
War, by and large, did not fight to save the dictator they previously seemed to have supported” 
(Greif & Tadelis, 2010, p.240). While the periods of CCP history defined by charismatic-
ideological and economic-performance legitimacy will involve a discussion of policy 
achievement, no such attempt will be found in Chapter 3. Instead, the ongoing Xi Jinping 
administration’s strategy will be exploratory, and the CCP’s strategy will be discerned by study 
of the rhetoric found in speeches, official mouthpieces, and government documents as well as 
academic research from both English and Chinese-language sources.   
As Bondes and Heep describe, the official framing legitimacy approach “[contends] that 
the ruling elites in authoritarian regimes propagate official frames in a continuous effort to 
reproduce the belief of the populace in the elites’ leadership qualities and their determination to 
serve the common interest” (Bondes & Heep, 2013, p.317). Given the CCP’s well-documented 
intervention and censorship practices within Chinese media, the official framing approach is 
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highly suitable for critical analysis of the CCP’s identified legitimization threats and strategic 
approach (Yao et al, 2011; Wang, 2013).  
While the academic sources within this thesis are biased towards Western views, 
theoretical bias may be not as severe as it may seem. Chinese literature on political legitimacy is 
often inspired by Western thinkers (Zhang, 2013, p.9). In fact, an analysis of Chinese articles 
dated from 2008 to 2012 revealed a recent academic irony. While Western scholars increasingly 
interpret CCP legitimacy through the lens of the past, Chinese scholars study Western legitimacy 
theories, with roughly 40% of articles citing Weber, Habermas, Huntington and Lipset (Zeng, 
2014). 
Morality 
Another critical distinction for this thesis is delineating the divergence between moral-
ideological legitimization and morality. While this thesis argues that the Xi administration is 
pursuing a moral-ideological legitimization strategy, the argument is morally agnostic. The 
central argument concerns domestic official framing and only touches upon implementation 
success or failure when it influences future legitimization strategy in some way. 
Central & Local Government Distinction 
The Chinese government is far from monolithic, with provincial governments running 
budgets exceeding that of some countries and numerous ministries overseeing a broad array of 
functions. The portion of the Chinese government addressed is the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China (“Central Committee”), especially the Central Politburo of the 
Communist Party of China (“Politburo”) and the Standing Committee of the Central Political 
Bureau of the Communist Party of China (“Politburo Standing Committee”). These comprise the 
highest tiers of central government, with the Politburo Standing Committee acting as the de facto 
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decision-making body of the party. The central government sets the legitimization strategy of the 
CCP at a national level while local governments are more detached from the legitimization 
question; thus, the public image goals of the central government are the chief focus of this thesis.  
 Additionally, the central government and its subsidiary local governments often act 
independently. While top-level corruption undoubtedly exists, particularly in light of the 
infamous Bo Xilai affair, local government corruption is undoubtedly more prevalent. In 
imperial China, a proverb arose detailing the mismatch between central government policies and 
local government enforcement (天高皇帝远2). Accordingly, measures of public political support 
distinguish between diffuse (national government) support and specific (local government) 
support. A 1997 study hypothesizes that citizens dissatisfied with local governance exhibit a 
differential between their mean diffuse support and specific support metrics because “[they 
believe] they might enjoy the support of higher levels of government” (Saich, 2007, p.23). The 
differential is often significant. Survey results conducted in both rural and urban China in 2007 
found 86.1% of respondents reported they were “very satisfied” or “somewhat satisfied” with the 
central government (Saich, 2007, p.4). The respondents’ satisfaction with local governments 
were noticeably lower. The lowest level of government included in the survey was the “township 
government”; only 43.6% of respondents were “very satisfied” or “somewhat satisfied” (Saich, 
2007, p.4). In Saich’s exploration of citizen perception, he considers the central government 
distinct from the provincial, county, and township governments (Saich, 2007). Further, the 
differential between diffuse and specific support is particularly prominent in less-developed 
regions, whereas “coastal and metropolitan areas” tend to hold more critical attitudes towards the 
                                                          
2 Shan gao, Huangdi yuan – literally translates to “The mountains are high and the emperor is far away”. This 
proverb is used to describe that even when the central government sets policies, without close supervision, local 
governments are the emperors of their own local domains.  
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central government (Lewis-Beck, et al., 2013, p.7). The central government’s legitimization 
strategy may or may not have the intended effect of benefiting local government legitimacy.  
Syntax 
For consistency, Chinese names and geographic features will be referred to using Wade 
Giles pinyin format. This format is the mode of expression preferred by the CCP and used in 
official communications. For example, “Kuomintang” will be referred to as “Guomindang” and 
“Mao Tse-tung” will be referred to as “Mao Zedong”.  
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Chapter 1   Charismatic-Ideological Legitimization 
 
The policies of Mao Zedong, particularly during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural 
Revolution, chartered the course of the CCP. Chapter 1 establishes a foundation for 
understanding the founding principles of the CCP and the reasons why economic-performance 
legitimacy became the norm in the period following Mao’s death.  
Mao Zedong: An Early Portrait 
The story of the CCP begins with the demise of the Qing dynasty. Though the Manchu-
led Qing dynasty had successfully unified China, the early 20th century saw uprisings born of 
increasing Han Chinese nationalism and disgust for the political impotence and glaring 
corruption. The Nationalist Republic of China3 (or Guomindang) filled the power vacuum 
formed by the abdication of the last Chinese emperor in February 1912 but struggled to maintain 
control over a society unused to Republican rule. Though the Guomindang formally led the 
nation, the decades following its formation were “known as the ‘Warlord Era’”, due to 
widespread factionalism (Horner & Brown, 2011). The roots of Communism in China were 
formally established in 1921, developed in opposition to the Guominding. Prior to the victory of 
the CCP in 1949, China was embroiled in a civil war between the Communists and the 
Guomindang, which was punctuated by the Second Sino-Japanese War. It was during this period 
of shifting alliances and lengthy battles that the ideological basis of the CCP gestated.  
Mao Zedong4, the eventual Chairman of the CCP, and Jiang Jieshi5, the President of the 
Nationalist Republic of China, both wrote extensively during wartime to outline their political 
                                                          
3 Frequently referred to by Western sources as “Kuomintang” 
4 Alternative name: Mao Tsetung 
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views and ideological platform. Charles Stevens, writing for the Asian Survey in 1964, conducted 
a comparative content analysis of selected propaganda pieces by Mao Zedong with Jiang Jieshi’s 
China’s Destiny from the same wartime period. The selection of Mao’s writings comprised of 
essays most well-known and familiar to his Chinese contemporaries. The comparative analysis 
involved comparable text length. The overall purpose of the study was to create a common 
mechanism by which to evaluate the extent to which both writers valued common issues. He 
isolated key ideological issues present in both selections and developed a point system based on 
the frequency of relevant jargon. The terms researched included culture, politics, economics, 
international relations and history and were selected for both literal and connotative meaning. 
Each occurrence of a relevant term was scored one unit with additional unit weighting assigned 
when the entire passage focused on the term.  
The results of the 1964 study are eye-opening for they illustrate not only each leader’s 
political priorities but also insight into the greater popular appeal of Maoist thought. Given that 
nationalism played a lead role in the political rhetoric of the time, the greater appearance of 
jargon concerning nationalism above all other ideological term groups is hardly surprising. For 
the category of “nationalism”, Mao scores 990 units to Jiang’s 2552 units, indicating a strong 
preference on Jiang’s part for promoting his political party on those grounds (Stevens, 1964, p. 
895). Critically, the next most frequent ideological categories were political progressivism and 
economics, both of which are aligned to reform and policy-making. In the category of political 
progressivism, Mao scores 333 units to Jiang’s 164 units (Stevens, 1964, p. 895). For usage of 
words regarding economics, particularly economic reform, Mao scores 213 units to Jiang’s 64 
units (Stevens, 1964, p. 895). Stevens postulates that Mao’s political success came as a result of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
5 Frequently referred to in the West as “Chiang Kai-shek” 
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deploying relatively actionable platform points (political progressivism and economics) 
alongside a requisite emphasis on nationalism.  
Secondary results of the analysis further illuminate Mao’s psyche. In contrast with his 
ideological foil, Mao demonstrated a lower reliance on appeals to “Chinese uniqueness” or anti-
Japanese sentiment within his discussions of nationalism (Stevens, 1964, p. 899). Instead, Mao 
expounded the distinct benefits only the CCP could claim, like systemic reform. Mao’s writings 
also exhibit his talent for attack propaganda. Mao scores 137 units for the term “Jiang Jieshi” and 
612 units for “Kuomingtang”, while Jiang Jieshi never mentions Mao in his writing and 
mentions “Communism” relatively rarely (60 units) (Stevens, 1964, p. 894). Furthermore, Mao 
put himself on the defensive in his writings while Jiang generally paid no heed to criticism.  
Overall, reading Mao’s wartime writings, particularly when contrasted with those of 
Jiang Jieshi, reveals two of his strategic trademarks. First, Mao appealed to common people 
more effectively than Jiang Jieshi by discussing reform-oriented ideology in his essays, more 
concretely claiming a devotion to change. Jiang Jieshi damaged his credibility before the 
disenchanted citizens he was courting by appealing to lofty ideals, creating the impression of 
elitism and aloofness. Second, Mao demonstrated his willingness to and talent for employing 
propaganda for mass appeal. Whether or not Mao’s high degree of responsiveness in both 
attacking and defending himself from his political opponents stemmed from ideology-driven 
passion or from personal insufficiency, his strategy converted more ideological disciples than 
Jiang Jieshi was able to. 
Further early indications of Mao’s political approach are found in his study preferences. 
During his formative years, Mao was personally “interested mainly in speculative subjects, such 
as world and national politics” and came to feel that “those who are most divorced from reality 
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are the ones in the departments of arts, be they students of history, philosophy, or economics” 
(Dittmer, 1974, p.39). Mao strongly believed that “direct experience [was] a better teacher than 
emulative book learnings” and that “ideology and politics are the leader and the soul” (Dittmer, 
1974, p.36). Given his love of the human spirit and pursuit of speculative subjects, Mao avoided 
talk of specifics for he believed specifics undermined ideological purity. He preferred to “talk 
only of large matters – the nature of man, of human society, the world, and the universe” 
(Dittmer, 1974, p.37). Mao may have led a movement based on bookish Communist roots but he 
was perceived less so as a philosopher than as a selfless soldier whose leadership shone during 
the Long March. First and foremost, Mao gained leadership of the Communist movement 
through military achievements and a flair for arousing the urgency and passion within his 
followers.  
The final battle that toppled the Guomintang was waged over the city of Chengdu, the 
last outpost of the Nationalist Party. The defeat of the Guomintang cast the last bloody vote for 
the CCP as Jiang Jieshi fled to Taiwan, permanently. For the CCP, the battle for China was over 
but the battle for political legitimacy had only just begun.  
The Legitimization Strategy of the Nascent CCP  
Upon the formal creation of the People’s Republic of China on October 1st, 1949, the 
CCP entered into a period of irresolute ideology. The newly anointed party leaders comprised of 
revolutionary heroes more accustomed to tactical maneuvers than policy-making. The CCP 
squabbled over how to implement Communism, namely if the Soviet model suited the needs of 
China. Ultimately, Communist reformers settled on an implementation model distinct from the 
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Soviet system while appropriating legitimacy from its more established ally (V.Racknitz, 2014, 
p.498). As a Chinese proverb goes: “狐假虎威”6. 
 Borrowing from Soviet Communist legacy and establishing its economic policies was 
insufficient for the long-term entrenchment of Chinese Communism, especially given that the 
Soviet Union, a recently development of 1922, did not yet have the reputation to command 
Weberian traditional legitimacy. The existential imperative for the CCP was spreading 
Communist ideas to the Chinese populace and enforcing ideological adherence. Pursuing 
ideological legitimization was, perhaps, the only viable legitimization strategy accessible to the 
fledgling CCP. Lowell Dittmer of the University of Chicago hypothesizes that the CCP’s 
legitimization strategy was made in response to the lack of mass acceptance of “rational-legal 
formalism as a legitimation for political domination” (Dittmer, 1974, p.48). Given the nature of 
charisma, it seems likely that the early CCP did not anticipate the eventual cult of personality 
that would someday develop around Mao Zedong. While the charismatic nature of Mao’s 
ideological legitimization strategy became a cornerstone of the Mao-led CCP, the initial 
legitimization strategy was a reaction to previous governance.   
 Under Mao’s firm control, the CCP’s charismatic-ideological legitimization strategy 
sought to replace traditional cultural norms and maintain the revolutionary spirit. Traditional 
cultural norms favored imperialism, and thus posed a legitimacy threat to the CCP. The imperial 
dynasties, under Weber’s three types, were perceived by the populace as legitimate on a 
combination of legal-rational and traditional legitimacy. Thus, Mao sought to attack the cultural 
norms by reeducating the public to instill an affinity with the Soviet Communist legacy rather 
than with an imperial one. Confucianism, considered a cornerstone of imperial rule and 
                                                          
6 This proverb is based on a story of a fox attributing the source of other animals’ fear to herself by walking in front 
of a tiger, thus convincing the tiger she holds great influence. This story is used in reference to weaker individuals 
borrowing influence from stronger individuals to achieve goals they could not obtain by themselves. 
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traditional thought, was also deemed a target for Mao. As for maintaining the revolutionary 
spirit, Mao’s reputation and apparent charisma in the Chinese Communist Revolution laid the 
foundation for urging the masses to perpetuate the revolution by opposing the looming threat of 
the bourgeoisie and taking on a personal role, often in the form of popular vigilantism, in the 
elimination of CCP threats.  
Crumbling Traditional Cultural Norms 
Key to legitimizing Communism was delegitimizing prior regimes. The CCP sought to 
fundamentally change the values of Chinese society to favor Communist collectivism and 
discredit imperialism. Mao’s attitude, or rather, contempt, for imperialism was palpable. He 
sought to reform the ideological groundwork of Chinese thought by subverting the historical 
narrative of China and undermining the legitimacy of Confucianism.  
Under Mao’s direction, academics in China sought to rewrite the course of Chinese 
historiography “away from the cyclical, dynastic model” to favor a narrative “generative of 
popular national sentiment” (V.Racknitz, 2014). Under the dynastic model, government 
legitimacy is derived from Tianming7. This theory describes rulers as imbued with legitimacy by 
the Heavens, with the ruler tasked with the duty of caring for the interests of the people. If the 
ruler did not fulfill his or her duty to the people, the overthrow of the ruler was justified for the 
Heavens would choose a more suitable person to fulfill the duty. While the idea of Tianming 
originated from the overthrow of the Shang dynasty by the Zhou dynasty and is not 
fundamentally incompatible with the proletariat struggle concept ascribed to Communism, the 
CCP viewed the dynastic model as a threat to its establishment. First, the dynastic narrative 
would model the CCP as the successor to an imperial legacy, a continuation rather than a 
                                                          
7 Also known as “Heavenly Mandate” or “The Mandate of Heaven” 
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dramatic break. Second, Tianming had already become intertwined with Confucianism, which 
Mao believed ran counter to Marxism and posed an ideological threat. Tradition and respect for 
the past was infused in Chinese culture. Mao desired full commitment to the Communist ideal 
and would not allow nostalgia for a storied, glittering past.  
To counter the ideological threat of imperial China, the CCP introduced changes to the 
educational system. Universities increased departments focused on Western world history, 
particularly the history of Russia and its transition to becoming the Soviet Union (V.Racknitz, 
2014. Middle school curricula mirrored the increased emphasis on world history when the CCP 
made the subject a mandatory course of study (V.Racknitz, 2014. The purpose of early 
educational focus on Western history was to develop a sympathetic view amongst Chinese 
citizens towards ideological allies and to replace the imperial heritage with a Communist one.  
The CCP’s legitimization-by-proxy strategy was similarly observed in its establishment 
of Soviet-inspired informal education resources. Prior to the Cultural Revolution, the devotion of 
the CCP to establishing libraries reflected its strong Soviet ideological influence. In the first ten 
years after the founding of the People’s Republic, the CCP imitated the library system of the 
Soviet Union by establishing public libraries, Academy of Science libraries, and academic 
libraries (Lee-Hsia, 1981, p.418). By the end of 1958, roughly 35,000 libraries run by labor 
unions and 182,960 village-run libraries had developed across China (Lee-Hsia, 1981, p.418). 
Availing peasants and workers with library services was an extension of the Leninist view “on 
libraries as a means of mass education and indoctrination” (Lee-Hsia, 1981, p.418). The product 
of the library system was dramatically increased academic resource equality as “libraries in 
Shanghai, which for many years had been the cultural and publishing center of China, transferred 
500,000 volumes to help small libraries in six remote provinces, such as [Gansu] and [Xinjiang]” 
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(Lee-Hsia, 1981, p.419). The actions of the CCP in influencing academia and educating the 
public on Western history served to align Communist China to the Soviet legacy, rather than an 
imperial one. 
Over time, the Party became increasingly focused on Mao-specific thought. Not simply 
invoking Marxist-Leninist ideas, “the ideological mainstay of the Cultural Revolution in China 
was the Thought of Mao [Zedong]” (Melnick, 1976). Maoist thought infiltrated every facet of 
education. “Mao Thought Study Classes” were created to educate the People’s Liberation Army. 
‘May Seventh Cadre Schools’ were established for Party officials.” (Melnick, 1976). Most 
astonishingly, “even ‘miracles’ were attributed to the correct application of Mao [Zedong] 
Thought to every human activity and condition, such as curing cancer, healing deaf-mutes, and 
improving labor productivity and understanding” (Melnick, 1976). 
Mao also emphatically targeted Confucianism, another cornerstone of imperialism. The 
demise of the Qing dynasty had relaxed the hold of Confucianism over Chinese society by Mao’s 
time. Confucianism began to fall out of vogue after the revolution to overthrow the Qing dynasty 
for political commentators cited Confucian thought as a source of rot in imperial China, if not its 
downfall. In 1916, Yi Baishi questioned the character of Confucius, claiming that he was merely 
an ingratiating official of the state who massaged the egos of his superiors with his wavering 
writings on virtue and moral code (Miller, 2010). Mao advanced the demise of Confucianism for 
he dismissed social harmony and portrayed it as a tool used by imperial stated to suppress the 
common people (Miller, 2010). The CCP chipped away at Confucianism, choosing instead to 
instill in its constituents a revolutionary zeal.  
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Maintaining the Revolutionary Spirit 
Mao used his powerful ability to drive people to action to give rise to popular vigilantism 
as he consistently cited the need for constant revolution. As a result of his persuasion, historic 
Confucian sites, like Confucius’s burial ground, were vandalized by Chinese people emboldened 
by the dogma and encouragement of the CCP (Miller, 2010). As part of the revolutionary spirit, 
Mao required an ideological loftiness. In his 1959 speech at the 8th Plenary Session of the CCP, 
he stated that “it seems to be impossible to [evaluate project results like the commune] if 
economic accounting is applied” (Dittmer, 1974). Opposed to careful cost accounting and 
economic payoffs, Mao instead valued selflessness and masochistic willingness to accept 
setbacks. Mao expected political service to be “dramatically inspiring, usually of limited duration 
(as in martyrdom), and utterly altruistic – that is, it should not merely transcend but should 
contradict the actor’s own interests” (Dittmer, 1974). Mao expressed the need for revolutionary 
spirit and ideological adherence to extremes. So committed was Mao to reducing the gap 
between elites and the masses that he was opposed to the gauze masks worn by doctors for 
“these screened [doctors] off from the people” (Dittmer, 1974). 
Much of Mao’s appeal came from his rousing speeches, which made observers in the 
Soviet Union believe that Mao’s legitimization strategy was predominantly contingent on a cult 
of personality. Writing in 1964, Leonid Il’ichev, a top-ranking leader in Soviet Union, distanced 
Chinese Communism from Soviet Communism, saying that “the Communist Party of China does 
not exist and act on the basis of the priniciples of democratic centralism but in an atmosphere of 
the cult of the individual. The ideology of the cult of the individual contradicts the very spirit of 
Lenin’s teaching” (Melnick, 1976). Another Soviet, writing for the Soviet Academy of the 
Sciences, names the five characteristics of Maoist legitimation: “(1) the admission of the CCP of 
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Mao’s political program as the fundamental program of the Party; (2) the liquidation or 
neutralizing of Party opposition; (3) the personal authority of Mao as set against the Party; (4) 
executive support for the cult within the People’s Liberation Army; “and (5) the transformation 
of the cult of [Mao Zedong] into an independent political-ideological weapon of the Peking 
hierarchy, as separated from the person of [Mao] himself” (Melnick, 1976). Both sources 
emphasize the impact of Mao’s cult of personality and the influential role it played in gaining 
popular support for his policies.  
Problems Created under Charismatic-Ideological Legitimization 
The inherent legitimacy problem posed by charismatic-ideological legitimacy is that of 
longevity. Under a system contingent on the charisma of a single figure, once the figure departs 
the picture, the whole legitimization strategy collapses. The only way to maintain charismatic-
ideological legitimacy past the first generation is to pass power along family lines and convert 
the legitimacy type to that of traditional legitimization.  
The Great Leap Forward & Cultural Revolution 
The Great Leap Forward was a hugely unsuccessful attempt to transform China into an 
industrial giant. Mao’s effort to industrialize China began in 1957, after which steel plants were 
erected across the nation (Harms, 1996). At this time, “peasants already were forced to work in 
agricultural cooperatives” because “landowners had been stripped of their property” (Harms, 
1996). Mao declared an ambitious timetable for catching up with Western steel production, 
planning to overtake British production within a year’s time (Harms, 1996). Additionally, the 
government immersed the country in debt after government spending on heavy industry grew to 
comprise 56% of total state-sponsored capital investment (Harms, 1996). With the sole aim of 
the country focused on steel production, peasants deserted their stations in agricultural 
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cooperatives to pursue forge steel. During the winter of 1957-1958, “more than 100 million 
peasants were mobilized to build large-scale water conservation works” (Harms, 1996). 
Approximately 20 million people starved to death between 1959 and 1962, with some estimates 
as high as 43 million, because agricultural production was depressed by steel production aims 
(Jacob, 2013). Within three years of commencing the Great Leap Forward, the CCP had to 
quickly conclude it.  
The Cultural Revolution was launched by Mao to combat the capitalist forces he viewed 
as threatening Chinese Communist. Two of the most significant policies enacted during this time 
were the “closure of schools and the Send-Down Movement” (Zhou, 2014, p.22). Due to Mao’s 
preference for experiential versus formal education, he shut down schools nationwide. At the 
same time, he initiated a program that forced the immigration of huge numbers of people, 
particularly those who posed a political threat to him. Some claim that “Mao resorted to the more 
direct, political solution of transferring redundant urban labor, deviant cadres, idealistic or 
troublesome youth, and the like to the countryside en masse for permanent relocation” to protect 
his political position (Dittmer, 1974). 
Research reveals that long-lasting effects of the Cultural Revolution include negative 
impacts on “educational attainment, work experience, marriage history, health condition and 
attitude towards determinants of personal success” (Zhou, 2014, p. 22). Other studies note the 
tremendous loss of human capital (Bai, 2015, p.20). In combination with the chronic 
malnutrition experienced as a result of the Great Leap Forward and its lasting impact on 
development, Mao’s policies during this regime led to indebtedness, loss of human capital, and 




Mao Zedong’s passion for the revolutionary spirit may have invigorated the hearts of 
Chinese citizens but led to country-wide starvation and forced China to take a step backwards, 
developmentally. However, his legacy also enabled his successors to reverse the damages he 
inflicted on the nation in a meteoric economic rise. Without Mao’s establishment of firm media 
controls, his indoctrination of party loyalty, and his development of a cult of personality, the 
administrations following his would have encountered greater resistance than they did during the 
market reform period.  Though higher education suffered during the Cultural Revolution, mass 
public education allowed China to catapult itself under the economic-performance-focused 
model.  
The death of Mao Zedong spelled the end of charismatic-ideological legitimization for 
the CCP. The Gang of Four, a group led by Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, commandeered the CCP 
during the latter years of the Cultural Revolution but was swiftly deposed and smeared by the 
successor to Mao, Hua Guofeng. Hua Guofeng was selected by Mao but, as argued by Lowell 
Dittmer, charismatic leaders are “likely to select a member of his own administrative staff [and 
will] ensure that his choice will be limited to self-effacing, patient types” (Dittmer, 1974, p. 49). 
With Mao’s “cult of personality” laid to rest, Hua was left with the dilemma of solving the litany 
of social and economic problems left in the wake of the Cultural Revolution while verbally 
invoking what ideological legitimacy the CCP retained from the memory of its founder. For the 
immediate period following Mao’s death, Hua “[defended] the legitimacy of their new policies” 
by manipulating quotations because they still considered an appeal to Mao’s authority as the 
“most effective weapon” (Tokuda, 1980, p.161). Hua’s stopgap strategy parallels that of the 
early CCP when it initially aligned with Soviet Communism.  
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As poverty afflicted the nation, and those who suffered under the Cultural Revolution 
sought redress, to maintain an ideological legitimization strategy, the CCP needed to install a 
charismatic leader or seek alternatives. Bereft of its irreplaceable legitimacy personified, the 




Chapter 2   Economic-Performance Legitimization 
 
In reaction to the legitimacy vacuum left in Mao Zedong’s wake, post-Mao leadership scrambled 
to save the country from the negative aftereffects of Mao’s policies. While initially invoking the 
memory of Mao as a stopgap source of legitimacy, Deng Xiaoping – finally back from political 
banishment – began the systematic reversal of Maoist economic policy. Chapter 2 describes how 
the rapid liberalization of China’s markets was enabled by the authoritarian foundation 
established under Mao’s regime and required by the harrowing economic situation. While 
reforms of Deng Xiaoping led to the starry rise of China’s economy, the dogged pursuit of 
economic gain, coupled with unchanged social policies, produced an array of inequalities. These 
inequalities eventually led to the rewriting of CCP legitimization strategy. While inklings of the 
new moral-ideological legitimization strategy emerged in the early 2000s, the CCP continued 
displaying significant economic-performance legitimization activities until around the global 
economic crisis of 2008. 
Economic-Performance Legitimization as a Reaction to Mao 
In the wake of Mao’s death, Deng Xiaoping pushed for reforms to prevent the collapse of 
the weak Chinese economy. Deng described his own experience as “crossing a river by feeling 
the stones” given the massive confusion the ensued (The Second Long March, 2008). However, 
at the time of China’s economic re-opening, the political climate of the CCP initially prevented a 
swift about-face in legitimization strategy. In the 1980s, the top echelon of the central 
government was comprised of revolutionary veterans who had participated in the uprising of the 
CCP and derived their party loyalty through long-term, personal involvement. While recognizing 
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the economic shortfalls of China, they attributed “poor performance to inexperience and Mao’s 
personal mistakes”, maintaining the ideology-based legitimation strategy of the CCP (Zhao, 
2009). Instead, the economic-performance legitimacy strategy emerged naturally.  
For citizens who had lost faith in state socialism and became aware of famines and 
Cultural Revolution atrocities, “moral and economic performance reemerged to become an 
important criterion of state legitimacy” (Zhao, 2009). The “new open-door policy allowed 
Chinese to have better access to information, which opened the eyes of the ordinary Chinese and 
shattered their trust in Mao and the CCP…it was amid this legitimacy crisis that the Chinese 
government gradually evolved from an ideology-based revolutionary regime into a performance-
based authoritarian regime” (Zhao, 2009). Though to address poverty and achieve economic-
performance legitimization, Deng had to pursue economic growth, he nonetheless maintained a 
firm grip on political expression.  
Deng first pushed to increase the agricultural output of China, incentivizing their 
production by raising prices (The Second Long March, 2008).  Deng achieved this by beginning 
the “household-responsibility system” in rural areas, granting farmers ownership of their crops 
while the land remained the property of the state (Le & Rabinovitch, 2008). Population control 
measures were established soon after the beginning of market reforms, begetting the one child 
policy. In 1980, Shenzhen become the test site of a “special economic zone”, the success of 
which transformed Shenzhen into a global “manufacturing and shipping powerhouse” (Le & 
Rabinovitch, 2008).  
Yet it was the enormous influx of opportunity and wealth to urban centers like Shenzhen, 
Shanghai, and Guangzhou that exacerbated wealthy disparity. The household registration system 
prevented people from moving away from their birthplaces, limiting many people to the 
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opportunities in their region (Kanbur & Zhang, 2005, p.12). China faced an urban-rural gap 
divided along regional lines, with the western regions of China experiencing the highest levels of 
urban-rural inequality (Sicular et al, 2008, p.123). The Gini coefficient of China, “which 
measures economic inequality in society, was estimated to be 0.33 in 1980 and rose to 0.45 to 
0.47 [in 2005 and 2006]” (Fan & Sun, 2008, p.1). 
Further growth occurred under the guidance of Jiang Zemin, who expanded China’s 
economic growth by endorsing mass construction and production while remaining “firmly in 
control, without ever changing [the CCP’s] intensely secretive [mode of governing]” (Faison, 
1999). Large-scale infrastructure build-outs, like that of the Three Gorges Dam, proceeded with 
little environmental protectionism. The Chinese population expanded rapidly during Jiang’s 
administration, putting a strain on resources (People’s Daily, 2002). While overall wealth 
increased in China, the gains in wealth came with significant costs.  
Problems Created by Economic-Performance Legitimization 
Market Instability  
The performance legitimation paradigm showed further signs of unraveling during the 
global financial crisis of 2008. While China was not initially hit as hard as the Western 
hemisphere, the financial crisis reduced global demand for China’s export sector. Consequently, 
the CCP put into play an enormous stimulus package. Initially, the CCP was praised at G20 
summits for its swift reaction to the global financial crisis (Gilley, 2010).   
While the massive stimulus package buffered China from the tremendous demand decline 
during the global financial crisis, the Chinese economy sectors restructured in such a way that 
growth slowdown was inevitable, despite Keynesian expansionary programs. Not only did global 
demand decline during this time period, but the CCP’s 12th and 13th Five-Year Plans both placed 
28 
 
great importance on large-scale deindustrialization to rebalance the economy with the 
understanding that export-led economic development was slim pickings (Wagner, 2016). The 
consequence of the initial $586 billion (USD) stimulus package was to set a precedent for minor 
stimuli packages, each with declining marginal utility from 2012 to 2014 (Wagner, 2016, p.14). 
The additional stimulus packages merely acted as short-term stopgaps for the Chinese economy, 
which no longer displayed growth drivers justifying the high expected GDP growth rates of pre-
financial crisis peaks (Wagner, 2016). Corruption and favoritism have influences the flows of 
stimulus money, for state-owned enterprises have benefited by funneling funds into 
infrastructure and real estate projects (Wagner, 2016). Chinese academics at the Renmin 
University of China have called China’s micro-stimulus policy a “near-sighted strategy” that has 
resulted in substantial “stimulus-dependence”, calling for necessary “improvement in social 
security systems and social programs designed for maintaining long run growth” (Liu et al., 
2015). 
The economic rebalancing attempted by the CCP aggravated existing financial issues, 
particularly given that the stimuli packages have been financed by “an excessive level of debt” 
(Wagner, 2016). While the financial future of China is indeterminate, the credit expansion 
brought on by the stimuli packages increases the risk of credit busts. While the publicly 
announced figures for the Chinese financial stimulus was 4 trillion yuan, professors at Tsinghua 
University and Hong Kong University indicated to the South China Morning Post that 
fundraising was closer to 12 trillion yuan, 8-9 trillion yuan of which has been lent to local 
governments using land as collateral, incentivizing local governments to inflate land prices 
(Shih, 2012). By making immense loans to local governments with poor creditworthiness, the 
central government manipulated the rule of law for the National Development and Reform 
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Commission sidestepped existing restrictions on “lower levels of government [with no legal 
power] to borrow money or guarantee loans” (Shih, 2012). Interestingly,  
Gorton and Ordonez argue that credit booms are typically harbingers of financial crisis 
risk, for easier access to capital incentivizes high collateral projects, which tend to bear low 
productivity characteristics (Gorton & Ordonez, 2016). They model a boom-bust cycle in which 
a credit boom, caused largely by a decay of credit information symmetry, is followed by a bust 
brought on by the inevitable release of hidden or obscured credit information (Gorton & 
Ordonez, 2016). Data supports that “a reallocation of resources from high productivity sectors 
(in manufacturing) to low productivity sectors (such as construction and real estate)” in China 
has occurred since the global financial crisis, which the CCP is hyperaware of (Wagner, 2016).   
Social Unrest 
While a significant wealth gap emerged as a result of economic growth, other costs of 
growth included: calls for democracy, poor environmental and food safety conditions, a 
widening wealth gap, and pervasive corruption. A more in-depth discussion of environmental 
and food safety issues along with the problem of corruption occur in Chapter 3. 
Democracy 
The most notable pro-democratic movement took place in 1989 in Tiananmen Square. 
The Tiananmen incident of 1989 was initially sparked by an increasing politicization of 
mourning for reformer Hu Yaobang. Student protestors presented a list of five topic-areas they 
wanted to discuss with Party leadership, named “the 1986 demonstrations and Hu Yaobang’s 
role in these demonstrations, the financial dealings of the leaders and their relatives, political 
freedoms [and] funding for tertiary education” (Sandby-Thomas, 2014, p.55). Besides ignoring 
the petition, the People’s Daily published a speech, purportedly authored by Deng Xiaoping, 
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which called the movement a “planned conspiracy”, drawing upon the same word choice used to 
condemn the Gang of Four (Sandby-Thomas, 2014, p.56). Angering the student protestors 
further, the situation ended in violence. The swift military crackdown on the student movement 
silenced backlash, and even now, the Tiananmen incident is a well-known censored search term 
on the Chinese internet.  
In the context of legitimization strategy, democracy plays a relatively minor role. The 
CCP has only one response to called for democracy: censorship and suppression. This approach 
holds true under any style of legitimization, for the CCP, highly sensitive to direct political 
threat, wields its media and propaganda organs closely for the express purpose of rapidly 
quieting dissent.  
Environmental & Food Safety 
While Chinese citizens were fairly convinced by the tremendous progress China has 
made economically that the Chinese government proven itself capable economically, its citizens 
are not so convinced that the government has the ability to maintain a high quality of life, 
particularly when it comes to food, air, and water quality. These subjects all fall under the 
umbrella of environmental concerns and fundamentally challenge the perception of the Chinese 
government as competent. For food alone, a number of scandals have dominated public 
discussion. Famously, Chinese infant formula manufacturers purposely used melamine, a 
chemical used in the production of industrial products, as a filler in their baby products. This 
shook consumer confidence in the Chinese milk market so significantly that as recently as 2015, 
the United States milk market was still benefiting from high milk demand from concerned 
Chinese parents8. Wealthy Chinese consumers have gone so far as to import canned air from 
                                                          
8 Based on data the author accessed at an internship 
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abroad to avoid the ill effects of breathing in the air pollutants that cast a haze over a number of 
major Chinese cities (Butt, 2016).  
The Decline of Economic-Performance Legitimacy 
The government’s dogged pursuit of performance legitimacy has run its course. Ample 
evidence indicates that the Chinese economy can no longer deliver astronomical GDP growth 
figures. Increasingly, media attention is focused instead on the stretch marks left by aggressive, 
government-led economic development. Glamorous office towers in major cities, in which real 
estate continues to be a hot commodity, are empty shells left to rot. Pollution is an immense 
headache, as a city-dwellers and countryside villagers experience deteriorating air, food, and 
water quality. Had the Chinese government maintained a steadfast adherence to performance 
legitimization, the central government’s reputation would be in shambles. Rather than adhering 
to an outdated legitimization strategy, the CCP has modified its approach to establish moral-




Chapter 3   Moral-Ideological Legitimization 
 
The economic-performance legitimization strategy adopted in the post-Mao period, while 
necessary to address extreme poverty and backwards development, resulted in significant 
environmental and social issues. The Hu and Xi-led administrations began the shift towards a 
new official rhetoric that emphasized the social-consciousness of the government. Today, the Xi 
Jinping-led government is building its legitimization activities around moral-ideological 
legitimacy, a direct reaction to the problems it has inherited.  
 
Moral-Ideological Legitimization as a Reaction to Performance Legitimacy 
Dominating national and international discourse are worrying signs that the economy has 
not only slowed its stupendous growth, but may face a swift drop further downward. Supporting 
economic slowdown are consumer spending gauges like cinema ticket sales, which signal 
slower-than-expected domestic consumption (BBC, 2016). More visible signs of economic 
instability, particularly those driven by unsynchronized government initiatives, are obvious 
domestically. While Western stock markets are dominated by institutional investors, about 85% 
of Chinese stock market activity originates from retail investors, or ordinary Chinese citizens 
(Shen & Goh, 2015). Many of these lay investors piled into the stock market in what the Wall 
Street Journal calls “faith-based stock investing”, depending on their faith in the central 
government’s manipulation of the market more so than a studied analysis of company 
fundamentals or even technical trading indicators (Browne, 2015). Consequently, initial 
government intervention designed to prop up weak stock markets backfired for it attracted the 
hard-earned savings of vulnerable populations. Lacking patient institutional capital, retail 
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investors are hardwired to react aggressively to any market oscillation, like those caused by 
underpriced initial public offerings (IPOs), dramatically increasing the volatility of Chinese 
markets (Fahey & Chemi, 2015). Capital controls also ensure that foreign investors have limited 
access to the Chinese stock market, uncoupling the Chinese stock market from exchanges across 
the globe, for better or for worse (R.S., 2014). Thus, the CCP is locked in a pact with the devil, 
obligated to continue its policy of intervention until a dramatic bust or drop the act now to 
reform the system and face immediate backlash from the majority of Chinese citizens.  
Further signs of inherited economic weakness are seen all over China’s vast geography. 
At the peak of its economic success story, the policies of the CCP exacerbated socioeconomic 
divergences between the urban nouveau-riche and underserved farmers (Yao & Wang, 2013). 
Over 500 ghost cities, or cities built but wholly unoccupied, have been constructed since 1978 to 
sustain China’s economic growth miracle (Tarantola, 2013). Local governments lined their own 
pockets by rubber-stamping approval for proposed projects despite uncertain long-term demand 
and the consequent need to displace impoverished populations (Tarantola, 2013). The harsh 
reality was that those who lacked housing – particularly those displaced in the build-out – did not 
have the means to afford the new developments. Speculators descended on skeletal new 
developments in droves, driving up the price of units, and further reduced the affordability of 
housing. Meanwhile, major cities are experiencing tremendous real estate price inflation as 
capital controls designed to benefit low-tier cities instead increase ownership stratification in top-
tier cities (Bloomberg, 2016).  
Even beneficiaries of economic growth face are marred; when they are not frantically 
diverting their assets overseas, they are faced with high levels of depression and suicide (Ren, 
2016). National well-being surveys conducted by the CCP reveal an ironic – albeit unsurprising 
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– development paradox. While those who did not experience a change in socioeconomic status 
did not report a significant change in happiness, those who were upwardly mobile during China’s 
economic boom reported a substantial declines in happiness metrics. These metrics include 
“[mental and physical health], education, marital status, formal household registration (hukou), 
and housing status” (Graham et al., 2015). In context, research indicates a stronger correlation 
between measures of life satisfaction and good governance than between measures of life 
satisfaction and real per capita incomes (Helliwell & Huang, 2006). Rising inequality and lower 
perceived life satisfaction throw into question the ability of the CCP to lead the nation.  
Political legitimacy threats originate from sources beyond the economic and social 
changes directly brought on by rapid economic development. Ethnic minority groups, such as the 
Uighur minority, clamor for independence have been a motif for the past centuries, with resultant 
terrorist activity an increasing source of concern (Drennan, 2015). Visible environmental 
disintegration has struck fear in the hearts of Chinese citizens concerned for future generations. 
Residents of Shanghai were disgusted by the over 16,000 diseased pig carcasses found floating 
in the Huangpu River, the city’s source of tap water (Davison, 2013). On Chinese social media, 
one user disparaged the government’s “sluggish response [and] lack of disclosure” regarding the 
Huangpu River’s reeking waters (Davison, 2013). The 2008 scandal over tainted infant formula 
panicked Chinese parents and led to public outcry over the government’s role in regulating basic 
food and environmental safety. Nearly all food and environmental safety scandals have been 
linked back to government corruption and spotty regulatory enforcement. Rapid economic 
development has deprioritized human safety in both the public and private sectors of China. 
While the CCP commands high levels of political support as measured via nationwide public 
opinion surveys in 2002, 2007-2008, and 2012-2013, if food and environmental issues – which 
35 
 
are basic livability factors – persist without noticeable improvement, there is no doubt the CCP’s 
legitimacy would be put to the test (Munro, et al, 2013). 
Broadly, the CCP’s riddle of the sphinx comes in the form of social instability. At the 
core source of social instability is rising socioeconomic inequality. Most post-Communist wealth 
originated from three sources. First, the private sector emerged as a competitive exporter on a 
global scale. Entrepreneurs who took advantage of the export industry and the associated 
opportunities flourished. Early entrants to markets created by market and social liberalization 
absorbed pent-up and newfound demand. Second, private sector inflows benefited the housing 
market, driving up demand and pricing in commercially-successful areas. Key business centers 
like Shanghai and Shenzhen witnessed skyrocketing property prices, with price per square foot 
rising to the level of cosmopolitan global peer cities. Most beneficiaries of housing market-
related wealth, particularly prior to the advent of large-scale speculative buying, were caught by 
surprise in the early 2000s and became overnight millionaires. The distribution of wealth 
disproportionately benefited urban dwellers over rural residents and favored the commercially-
gifted southern region over the northern region. The third source of wealth was an unfortunate 
consequence of unhindered capitalism. Corruption and graft snowballed as politicians at all 
levels of the government exchanged their political influence for bribes of all kinds. The Maoist 
doctrine of selfless Party service was all but forgotten as corruption was, by many counts, not 
only a frequent occurrence but often anticipated.  
The first two sources of wealth generated economic inequality, allowing a sufficiently 
high number of people to benefit economically, so much so that the needs of the 
socioeconomically disadvantaged were mentioned only in stump speeches. Given the economic-
performance legitimacy dogma that pervaded central government administration from the time of 
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market opening to the early 2000s, so long as GDP growth met or exceeded expectations and 
signs of economic development were visible to the masses, government legitimacy would not be 
threatened.  
The relentless pursuit of economic gain, combined with a lack of sufficient intellectual 
property rights, made the “Made in China” label known worldwide as a symbol of quality 
deficiency and cheap labor. Ironically, goods made for export tended to be higher quality, 
leaving Chinese citizens with shoddy seconds. If the impact of mass production was merely 
limited to secondary consumer goods such as clothing and appliances, perhaps the domestic 
outcry would not be as threatening. However, food quality has been so affected by capitalism 
that even building blocks of meals, like eggs, were fabricated with inedible, inorganic materials. 
Newspaper exposes of popular foods became commonplace, with nationally recognizable brands 
like White Rabbit and Mengniu taking turns under the spotlight. Food and food culture resonates 
strongly within the Chinese population, so inadequate food quality decreased consumer 
confidence in the government’s ability to regulate the most basic of resources. Visible at every 
economic tier, environmental and food safety related issues are the common denominator the 
central government cannot afford to ignore.  
The third source of wealth gives the CCP head-splitting headaches. Evidence shows that 
even those who have not witnessed corruption firsthand believe there are high levels of 
corruption due to word-of-mouth effects, making it critical to ensure corruption is as 
imperceptible as possible. Evidence of corruption directly counters to claims of government 
competence, which the central government is somewhat insulated from. Chinese citizens tend to 
view government more positively the more removed they are from direct engagement, with data 
showing greater central government support compared to local government support. However, 
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once local corruption reaches a critical level of perception, citizen support for the central 
government declines. The central government’s critical aim is to prevent local and national 
corruption from becoming visible enough to provoke backlash against the acceptance of the 
CCP. When corruption becomes too visible, the citizens assume that the central government has 
turned a blind eye to enforcement and may be engaged in corruption activities itself.  
Moral-Ideological Legitimization Strategy 
The CCP’s interpretation of its sources of legitimacy threats are summarized in an 
academic paper from the College of Marxism at Guangxi Normal University. The authors 
contend that the party faces four issues: (1) social issues, (2) large-scale domestic and 
international crises undermining the party’s ability to govern, (3) corroding rule of law and (4) 
Marxist ideology education problems (Zhang, 2016). The moral-ideological legitimization 
strategy adopted by the CCP is designed to combat the challenges it perceives. The strategy 
involves ideology-building components, an augmented responsiveness to social issues, and a far-
reaching anti-corruption campaign. The ideology-building components directly address the 
ideological education problems and large-scale domestic and international crises issues. 
Augmented responsiveness is an operational reaction to social issues, namely environmental and 
food safety concerns. Finally, the anti-corruption campaign directly attacked the concern of 
corroding rule of law.  
The reason morality and ideology form the basis of the current strategy of the CCP is 
because of its profound focus on social issues. Social issues contain an inherent moral element. 
By expressing its focus on social issues, particularly by using Confucian rhetoric, such as the 
word “harmony”. The moral-ideological legitimacy strategy was first demoed by Jiang Zemin in 
a 2002 speech emphasizing the importance of harmony (Miller, 2010). The first formal 
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introduction of the “Harmonious Society” mantra to CCP rhetoric occurred during the Sixth 
Session of the 16th Central Committee of the CCP in 2006 ( Miller, 2010). Further proof of social 
issue focus came in the form of a 2007 CCP report prepared by Wen Zibao, who “emphasized 
that ideological and moral education was necessary for the people” (Miller, 2010).  
Ideology-Building Strategies 
Magnification of Nationalism 
The CCP has redoubled its efforts to develop a sense of nationalism throughout the 
country. It seeks to achieve this aim by referencing classical Chinese history in its rhetoric, 
replacing its Mao-era Soviet alignment with a claim to China’s shining past as well as portraying 
foreign nations, particularly Japan, in anti-Chinese light. The realignment with classical Chinese 
history allows the CCP to latch onto the “century of humiliation” narrative in which China is 
portrayed as the victim of a series of foreign invasion which have prevented China from reaching 
its full potential. This narrative is based upon a claim to cultural superiority, and has the 
secondary benefits of establishing some form of traditional legitimization with the Chinese 
people, if the strategy is successful. Demonizing foreign nations has the effect of instilling fear in 
the Chinese people, necessitating the support of a strong central government, and thus increasing 
popular support. Dickson et al.’s research confirms that nationalism, and secondarily, fear of 
instability, are “important sources of legitimacy (Dickson et al, 2016, p.25).  
 In a study of the research priorities of universities in China, Ines Even v.Racknitz 
identified a “change in paradigms of political legitimation of power in China” in the mid-1980s 
(V. Racknitz, 2014). While “legitimation between 1949 and the mid-1980s rested very much on 
the notion that the old order [was] thrown over by a revolutionary state, [the post-Deng CCP 
emphasized] the continuity to a splendid imperial past, [rather] than the revolutionary traditions” 
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(V. Racknitz, 2014). The paradigm shift was reflected in an increased in academic research – and 
dedicated departments – devoted to the study of world history and “New” Qing history (V. 
Racknitz, 2014). 
Territorial disputes are an extension of the CCP’s long-term strategy to shift towards 
identification as the successor of earlier dynasties. The formal opposition of the CCP towards 
Japan sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands was a largely ceremonial stance designed to align the 
CCP with an imperial legacy, with historical claims to the islands rooted in the Ming Dynasty as 
well as pro-nationalism efforts by both the Republic of China and the People’s republic of China 
in the 1970s (Sandby-Thomas, 2015, p.103). In addition to a statement released on the front page 
of the People’s Daily in September 2012 by the foreign ministry, the CCP further escalated its 
contest of the Diaoyu Islands by dispatching patrol ships, organizing protests in over 50 cities, 
and lodging complaints with the United Nations (Sandby-Thomas, 2015, p.104).  
State sponsorships of protests was evidenced by reports of police officers directing 
protestors on how to behave as well as emphasizing central government support of the people’s 
right to air their grievances (Beach, 2012). The People’s Daily outright supported the protests, 
with an editorial calling the protests an extension of patriotic fervor from a bullied people, 
furthering the “century of humiliation” rhetoric propagated by the CCP (Beach, 2012). 
Using the Japan-as-aggressor narrative, the CCP was cast as the protective savior of the 
Chinese people from Japanese invaders (Friedman, 2008). The use of nationalist sentiment is not 
new to CCP strategy. Following the 1989 Tiananmen protests, the CCP buckled down on its anti-
Japanese propaganda campaign so much that one of the “best known films of the era” was the 
1987 “Red Sorghum”, in which the Japanese order the skinning of a live Communist guerilla 
fighter (Lague & Lee, 2013). A study of People’s Daily articles in 1985, 1995, and 2005 
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demonstrated usage of anti-Japanese phrases has increased dramatically in official media over 
time (Brooks, 2013,  p.224). The anti-Japan “century of humiliation” narrative is a motif the 
CCP has used successfully for many years, and in the buildout of ideological legitimizations, this 
tool is particularly useful. It is worth nothing that appeals to nationalism can be a double-edged 
sword; when China experienced the growth of popular nationalism in the 1990s, aggressive 
nationalist criticized the CCP’s perceived weakness in foreign policy affairs (Sandby-Thomas, 
2014, p.50).   
Enhanced Media Controls 
In spite of increased responsiveness to social issues (discussed in a later section), the 
CCP made media interactions with the public more transparent only for issues directly dealing 
with social issues that do not contest the structure of government. When it comes to pro-
democracy efforts, the CCP has maintained a cautious policy of censorship and suppression. In 
2008, over 8,100 Chinese people had already signed a manifesto called “Charter 08”, a major 
pro-democracy protest led by Liu Xiaobo, a literary critic (Washington Post, 2009). The Chinese 
propaganda machine immediately responded and blocked internet access to the protest 
movement, which had spread quickly via social media (Washington Post, 2009). 
Stockmann and Gallagher conducted a survey of four Chinese cities in 2005 learned 
about the grooming of public opinion via state-controlled media on the issue of labor disputes 
beginning in the 1980s-1990s and found that while citizens are aware of the state’s influence on 
mass media, even highly informed citizens are not strongly resistant to media messages 
(Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011, p.23). Their findings indicate that media coverage of labor 
disputes tend to sympathize with the underdog and “omits problems associated with 
implementation of the law and provides legitimating examples to other potential plaintiffs”, 
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meaning that “increased litigious behavior and a new emphasis on ‘rights’ protections” is not 
quite a legitimation crisis, but rather an extension of a broad party stance and attitude 
(Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011, p.23). Most intriguingly, the ability of the CCP to influence 
public opinions is bolstered by modern news formats such as news, ‘publicity’, and documentary 
rather than as the old style propaganda of a Leninist state”, which could indicate less political 
liberalization than often assumed (Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011, p.23).  
Responsiveness to Issues of Social Concern 
The CCP’s heightened responsiveness to issues of social concern takes on positive and 
negatives forms. First, the government show proven itself to be more sympathetic and 
benevolent towards social complaints that do not directly challenge government structure. In the 
Nu Jiang example discussed in the Three Gorges case study, the CCP tacitly withdrew the plans 
for a cascade of 13 dams along the Nu River. Following protests against a paraxylene plant in 
Xiamen with a turnout exceeding 10,000 protestors, the project was moved to Zhangzhou, where 
the local government emphasized transparency in the form of reports, publicity, and cadre access 
(The Economist, 2014). The government, having identified paraxylene as a hot social issue, 
reacted much more quickly when the second protest of similar origin erupted. In March 2014, 
demonstrations against a joint venture by the local government of the Guangdong province and 
Sinopec for the construction of a paraxylene (PX) plant broke out, with more than 1,000 
protestors demonstrating outside of government buildings (The Economist, 2014). Soon 
thereafter, the government delayed the protested Maoming/Guangdong project, a subtle 
retraction of a state-sponsored project.  
Another example of the CCP’s social consciousness policy is found in its piloting of 
collaborative policy-making. In 2011, the CCP consulted the public regarding tax-free allowance 
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proposal; ultimately, the majority of poll respondents preferred an allowance in excess of 3000 
RMB, which was greater than the original government proposal, which the government accepted 
(Cao, 2014, p.13). The involvement of citizens in formerly closed-door policy proposals signals 
that the government desires to appear responsive to Chinese citizens. 
Second, the CCP is reacting more quickly to perceived threats stemming from issues 
associated with intense social concern. In response to the melamine incident of 2008 involving 
Sanlu, the CCP’s “official discourse constructed problems narrowly, downplaying the Sanlu 
scandal as simply a food safety incident” while largely downplaying “participatory [roles] for 
non-state actors, such as citizens and lawyers, to help shape legal norms” (Lei & Zhou, 2015).  
The government’s heightened responsiveness to social issues, particularly protest-related 
topics like food and environmental safety has also led to broad policy shifts. Beginning 2012, the 
US Embassy in Beijing began publishing air pollution data – accessible to the Chinese public. 
The data indicated that air pollution in major cities was substantially higher than previously 
indicated by the Chinese government. The release of air pollution data was closely followed by 
an uptick in “mass incidents” protesting the poor environmental conditions and standards. 
Environment-related mass incidents increased by 31% from 2012 to 2013, prompting the release 
of a rapid series of environmental policies (Albert, 2016). Premier Li Keqiang declared “war” on 
pollution in May 2014, citing industrial pollution as a significant cause of smog and promising to 
reduce steel production, a highly polluting heavy industry (Martina et al., 2014). For the first 
time in a quarter century, the CCP amended China’s environmental protection law to increase the 
power of the environmental ministry in April 2014 (Kaiman, 2014). Given the environmental 
backlash related to the Three Gorges dam, Xi Jinping pledged to stop construction of new 
projects on the Yangtze River, which he called “an important ecological treasure”, in a January 
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2016 forum in Chongqing (Fang, 2016). The government’s commitment to embracing 
environmental protectionism is not only a highly effective mode of expressing moral-ideological 
legitimacy but is also a sign that the CCP recognizes environmental issues as a critical, 
legitimacy-impacting social issue. 
The CCP has also included into its social consciousness campaign and unprecedented 
willingness to criticize past administrations. In a notable example, involving the Southern 
Weekly, the May 21, 2012 edition of the magazine covered the famine that followed Mao’s Great 
Leap forward. The article described the history of China as “sometimes divided into two parts: 
history itself, and ‘admitted history’. The famine, which is unparalleled in human history, has 
neither an official record nor a reasonable explanation” (Mackinnon, 2012). Despite the article’s 
criticism of the past government administrations, censorship officials did not interfere with its 
publication. Another example of selective government censorship involved a May 2012 post on 
Weibo, which referenced the suicides of public figures that followed in the wake of Mao’s 
Cultural Revolution (Qin, 2012). Within a day, the uncensored post had been shared 4,696 times, 
with 1,131 comments, many of which were “confessional-style”, involving personal stories about 
family members who had suffered or even died (Qin, 2012). The government’s willingness to 
distance itself from past administrations, allows criticism of past governments aggrandize its 
own comparative morality. By emphasizing its willingness to side with the citizens by paying 
special attention to social issues, the CCP furthers its moral-ideological legitimization strategy to 





 The most famous corruption case in recent CCP history was that of Bo Xilai in 2013. 
Once a charismatic, self-promoting leftist rising political star, Bo was found guilty of taking 
bribes from a murdered British businessman, Neil Heywood. Bo’s wife, the murderer of 
Heywood, revealed the extravagant lifestyle Bo’s corruption had granted their now-infamous 
son, Bo Guagua (Huang, 2013). Bo’s reputation was left in tatters following the tremendous 
media frenzy that purused the entire Bo family throughout the case. The trial was so closely 
followed that Bo’s wife was scrutinized in photos, leading to social media gossip suggesting that 
she had hired a body double (Wu, 2012).   
Since Bo Xilai was a top succession choice for the CCP with an excellent record from his 
time managing Chongqing, the fall of Bo Xilai dealt a heavy blow to the CCP’s corruption 
reputations. In response to the fury aroused by Bo Xilai, as well as the accusations of corruption 
associated with many major projects (see Three Gorge case study), the CCP has adopted a 
strong-line attitude towards corruption, with Xi Jinping spearheading a concerted effort to topple 
even well-known, powerful political figures.  
Another dramatic figure caught in Xi’s sweeping anti-corruption campaign was Xu 
Caihou sounds like a character out of the Arabian Nights. The former vice-chairman of China’s 
Central Military Commission who was caught with “so much cash and gems that [investigators] 
needed a week to count it and 12 trucks to haul it away” (Clover & Anderlini, 2014). Not only 
was his cash stored in boxes, the boxes were labeled with the names of military officers who had 
paid him for their positions. 
The benefits of a widespread anti-corruption campaign are two-fold. First, the central 
government can create the perception that it is duly enforcing rule of law. Second, the central 
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government has the option of framing local governments as the chief source of rot. Due to an 
inherent local legitimacy deficit, in which the local government experiences less public opinion 
support than the central government, “if the central leadership has an intentional strategy of 
shifting the blame for public policy frustrations onto local governments while preserving popular 
support for the system as a whole, it seems to be working” (Dickson et al, 2016, p.25). A 
secondary benefit of anti-corruption campaigns is eliminating political dissidence within the 
party. Some commentators maintain that Xi Jinping has pursued a policy of not only reassuring 
the public that the government is properly enforcing rule of law  but also has used his campaign 
as a tool to dethrone political opposition. 
Case Study: The Three Gorges Dam 
Relevance to Political Legitimization Strategy 
 The Three Gorges Dam is an informative case study when illustrating the shift from 
performance legitimization to ideological legitimization. The project, at heart an economic 
endeavor, was widely publicized in the media required central government intervention, unlike 
other smaller-scale infrastructure projects. During the period of CCP history characterized by 
economic-performance legitimacy, infrastructure of a significant recipient of domestic and 
foreign investment. Major infrastructure projects were lauded as major public developments that 
created employment opportunities and fueled business opportunities. While the public evaluated 
the Three Gorges Dam project on the basis of economic performance during the build-out, public 
perception after the buildout was determined by social functionality and environmental impact. 
As a result of projects like the Three Gorges Dam, which raised public awareness of the social 
impact of economic growth, environmental degradation, and institutional corruption, the CCP 
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altered the course of its legitimization strategy to adapt to the changing burdens imposed by the 
Chinese public.  
Background of the Three Gorges Dam 
The Three Gorges Dam was the brainchild of Sun Yat-sen, who wrote in 1919 that the 
Changjiang River should be wrestled under control by a single massive dam or a series of 
smaller dams (Ponseti & Lopez-Pujol, 2006). This idea was laid by the wayside as other issues 
took priority and was not explored until substantial flooding of the Changjing in 1949 drove 
flood control to the top of the national agenda. After an onslaught of flooding activity in 1954 
caused the death of 30,000, the central government began to seriously consider the development 
of the Three Gorges dam as a flood control solution.  
The Three Gorges Dam project was funded partly through a special levy built into 
electricity prices between 1992 and 2009 (Hui & Blanchard, 2014). This makes the Three Gorges 
project a particularly sensitive subject for the Chinese populace because they feel personally 
invested.  
The Three Gorges Dam is a remarkable example of development politics. Midway 
through the construction of the dam, the Asian financial bubble burst and the dam project 
experienced a funding shortfall of $3 billion USD (Lee, 2013). Up until this point, Chinese 
authorities had largely framed the Three Gorges Dam as critical to Chinese modernization. 
However, when project leads sought out the global capital markets, transnational environmental 
campaigners dogged their footsteps by addressing their appeals to global investment banks and 
stock exchanges. Until the Chinese government shifted its marketing of the Three Gorges Dam 
from a development project to a hydropower and sustainability project, the Three Gorges 
Corporation was unable to issue bonds or stock on the international markets (Lee, 2013). 
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Officially completed in May 20129, the Three Gorges Dam was hailed as “the grandest 
project the Chinese people have undertaken in thousands of years” by the general manager of the 
Three Gorges Project Development Corporation (China Daily, 2006). The hydropower dam is 
capable of generating 22,500 megawatts of electricity, comprising nearly one-ninth of China’s 
total generated power. An engineering marvel standing at 181 meter high and spanning a 
distance of 2.34 kilometers, the Three Gorges Dam is the largest hydropower dam in the world 
by electricity production capacity. The dammed section of the Three Gorges region is now a 
reservoir over 650 kilometers long (The Guardian, 2011).  
Like many Chinese water works, the Three Gorges Dam is named after the area it now 
occupies. The dam is nestled in the midst of the Wu Gorge, the Qutong Gorge, and the Xiling 
Gorge (Handwerk, 2006).  This area was renowned for its aesthetic beauty and was frequently 
the subject of poems written by Li Bai, China’s most famous poet. The dam is managed by the 
Three Gorges Corporation, a state-controlled company established specifically for managing the 
dam. Not only did the Three Gorges Corporation oversee the construction of the dam, but it also 
manages, via a subsidiary, its substantial power operations in the present day.   
Central Government Framing of the Project under Performance Legitimacy 
The main benefits of the Three Gorges Dam as stated by official government 
mouthpieces at the time of construction were “flood control, power generation and navigation” 
(Embassy). The $25 billion USD dam was slated to generate 84.7 billion kilowatt-hours per year 
as well as provide access to interior regions to 10,000-ton ships (Lee, 2013). As with many dams 
built prior to China’s economic renaissance, the Three Gorges Dam was part of an overall 
government campaign to modernize China and fuel an economic boom. The project was intended 
                                                          
9 While the Three Gorges Dam was slated for completion in 2009, dam construction did not reach full functionality 
until 2012. The dam body, the most visible and physically large portion of the project, was finished in 2006. 
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to “pull resources, such as capital and production know-how, from the coastal area to form 
regional hubs of economic exchange inland” (Lee, 2013). 
Environmental Problems 
Environmental degradation resulting from the Three Gorges Dam has two general effects: 
increased threats to human life and pollution of natural resources. The enormous weight of the 
Three Gorges Dam reservoir has been linked to life-threatening landslide activity. Local officials 
of Miaohe, a mere 17 kilometers away from the dam site, are fearful that an entire mountainside 
is at risk of taking the lives of numerous villagers (Oster, 2007). Some government 
acknowledgement of safety risks has taken place for the government has begun providing 
landslide warning systems. Dam stability itself also poses an environmental threat; as a notable 
precedent, a 1975 dam collapse previously covered up by the Chinese government killed over 
10,000 civilians (Oster, 2007). Substantial evidence of pollution is present at the dam site. The 
vice director of the Department of Reservoir Management at the Three Gorges Project 
Construction Committee admitted that sewage levels within the reservoir were rising (Oster, 
2007). According to the Ministry of Environmental Protection, the Changjiang is heavily 
contaminated by copper, zinc, lead and ammonium (The Guardian, 2011). Reports by Chinese 
media and official government sources of polluted waterways and dam-related safety risks has 
fomented fear in citizens, manifested in public protests. 
Public concern over environmental degradation is alarming for the Chinese government. 
More than any other issue produced by the construction of the Three Gorges Dam, 
environmental degradation is most directly tied to political instability. A retired insider of the 
Committee of Political and Legislative Affairs identified “environmental concern” as the key 
catalyst behind 30,000 to 50,000 of the mass protests that occur in China every year (French, 
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2014). The negative impact of environmental protests on political stability has been well-
documented even at very high levels of Chinese government. This is significant given that the 
upper echelon of Chinese government is notoriously tight-lipped regarding threats to political 
authority. Zhou Shengxian, China’s first Minister of Environmental Protection, openly admitted 
that pollution has become kindling for “social instability” (French, 2014). Protests over “polluted 
water, damaged crops, air pollution, and forced resettlement” are the greatest harbingers of social 
unrest for Chinese leaders (Economy, 2004). 
The government’s willingness to admit to unrest triggered by concerns of environmental 
degradation is not surprising given the incontrovertible numbers. The prevalence of mass 
environmental protest has grown from 90,000 in 2006 to 180,000 in 2010 (Ogden, 2013). A 
doubling in mass protests in the span of four years is nothing to sneeze at, much less from the 
perspective of a controlled centralized government. This trend is confirmed by government 
figures, as Yang Zhaofei, Vice-Chair of the Chinese Society for Environmental Sciences, stated 
before the Standing Committee of the 11th National People’s Congress that there has been a 29% 
annual increase in the number of environmental protests in China since 1996 (Jie & Tao, 2012). 
Environmental protests are particularly effective because, as Shan Guangnai of the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences notes, environmental issues are relatively apolitical (Jie & Tao, 
2012). Protestors are less likely to believe that they will be arrested by authorities because 
environmental protests do not overtly challenge the government. In some cases, those wanting to 
protest other risky issues surrounding major projects use the kosher banner of environmental 
protest to lobby for private interests.  
In 2005, an environmental protest in Dongyang caught government authorities by 
surprise. Following rampant pollution by chemical plants in Dongyang, Zhejiang Province, and 
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reluctance of officials at all levels of government to respond, nearly 40,000 desperate villagers 
took to the streets and wreaked havoc in violent protest. The scale of the mass protest brought 
national attention to the incident, prompting full attention from the central government. The 
“main drivers of unrest [behind the Dongyang case were that] ‘entrepreneurial’ local 
governments [permitted] pollution and the lack of effective grievance relief channels” (Ma, 
2009). Why the massive protest took place in a rural area is understandable given that rural 
citizens are particularly sensitive to environmental pollution due to stunted health infrastructure 
and traditional agricultural interests. Perhaps a particularly worrying dimension of the Dongyang 
protests was that villagers outnumbered police by more than 3:1, forcing many police officers to 
flee. While the Dongyang mass incident was the first of its kind to be scrutinized under the 
limelight, many similarly large environmental protests have taken place in rural areas of China 
since 2005. 
Another environmental problem brought on by the construction of the Three Gorges Dam 
was poor silt control and increased flood risk. Flood control of the Changjiang River is in large 
part dependent on the intelligent management of silt. However, the Three Gorges reservoir is 
experiencing faster than expected sedimentation from the estimated 500 million metric tons of 
silt brought into the gorge area annually (Oster, 2007). Because sediment is trapped by the dam, 
the filtered Changjiang water gushes out at a much faster flow rate. Ironically, the force of 
filtered water threatens the integrity of downstream dikes as well as that of the layered limestone 
base of the dam itself. Further down the river, the opposite is true further downstream for 
drought conditions have emerged as a result of the dam’s construction, impacting communities in 
the Hunan and Hubei provinces (The Guardian, 2011). In fact, the Geological Society of London 
identifies slope instability as the Three Gorges Dam’s “most widespread natural hazard” (Oster, 
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2007). Due to design incompetence or poor foresight, the Three Gorges Dam does not 
successfully implement a flood control system.  
Upon completion in 200610, the Three Gorges Dam was lauded as “great engineering 
achievement” by the central government (Fang, 2016). However, “critics [have said] that the 
massive hydraulic project has caused many problems for the Yangtze River and its surrounding 
areas for over a decade – over 1.5 million residents living near the Yangtze River were forcibly 
resettled; deteriorating water quality endangered plant and animal life; and construction waste 
has caused sever environmental pollution (Fang, 2016). The increased silt concentration 
upstream of the Three Gorges Dam as inhibited the project from delivering navigation benefits. 
Shipping activity has halted along the middle stretches of the Changjiang (The Guardian, 2011). 
While the dam has not delivered on flood control and navigational promises, the dam had lived 
up to energy generation promises, at a cost. National security risks posed by the Three Gorges 
Dam were made apparent when the Chinese people uncovered a US Congressional report 
discussing the dam as a weak point and potential bombing target, prompting fury from General 
Liu Yuan in 2004 and furthered concerns of the Chinese people (Page, 2011). 
Social Problems 
Resettlement is a challenge for political stability because of the raw human drama that 
arises from the forcible uprooting of people from their homes. When over a million people are 
relocated, even the most vigorous attempts by the government to quell public discourse will 
inevitably fail. Shan Guangnai of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences called “illegal land 
seizures and relocations, labor disputes and environmental pollution [the] three factors driving 
popular protests” (Jie & Tao, 2012).  
                                                          
10 Only the body of the dam (not including turbines) was completed in 2006. 
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The Chinese government has not handled resettlement of residents of the Three Gorges 
Dam area well. Resettlement compensation, an expense recognized and adjusted for in the dam 
construction project, has not been effectively distributed to the appropriate recipients due to 
rampant abuse of funds by local governments. 
While government mouthpieces lauded efforts to help already economically 
disadvantaged groups find higher paying jobs in other regions, evidence suggests otherwise. 
Often, resettled villagers – frequently farmers – are shifted to plots of less fertile land. Poor 
villagers are forced to migrate longer distances into urban areas, where they are denied the job 
opportunities and social services they were promised. Some villagers were appalled to learn that 
the free education for their children they were promised as a condition of their resettlement was 
merely a pretense (Oster, 2007). Stranger are some of the promised compensation packages 
offered for resettlement. While government communication of resettlement timelines and details 
was poor, the efforts by the government to win popular support prior to dam proceedings were 
not as subtle as intended. Villagers noted that government-subsidized dowries, designed to make 
village daughters more competitive marriage counterparts in urban areas, were introduced before 
resettlement was even discussed (Oster, 2007).  
Corruption Issues 
One of the most unsettling consequences of the Three Gorges Dam project is not one 
grounded in engineering or policy but instead that deeply ingrained governmental corruption was 
unabashedly exposed to the public.  Corruption has plagued the dam project from start to finish. 
As already discussed, resettlement funds designed to assist those forced to move their livelihoods 
to other areas have not been equitably distributed to resettled populations. This phenomenon 
most frequently occurred at lower levels of government. Nonetheless, a number of high-level 
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officials were unable to escape graft probes. China’s anti-graft watchdog released a report on the 
Three Gorges Corporation in February 2014 on its official website detailing corrupt conduct. 
Chinese netizens discussed allegations online, with one Sina Weibo user asking (translated), 
“Did the Three Gorges fund paid by us all on every electricity bill actually go to feed dogs?” 
(Hui & Blanchard, 2014). 
Summary of Performance Legitimization Approach to the Three Gorges Dam 
 Liu Shukun, a professor at the China Institute of Water Resources and Hydropower 
Research, compared the Yangtze River to Xuanzang, the monk at the heart of Journey to the 
West (西游记), who is constantly “pursued by demons trying to eat his flesh”, because so many 
industries profit from the Yangtze’s resources (Fang, 2016). Under the performance legitimating 
strategy, the CCP valued the economic gains of the construction of the dam and the positive 
media spin such a massive “green” hydropower endeavor would generate. In allowing local 
governments to take unsupervised charge of the project, every stage of the project became 
flawed. At the design stage, the dam was designed to impress by size, rather than by 
functionality. Frequently comparisons are drawn between the Three Gorges Dam, which 
destroyed local ecology, and the centuries-old Dujiangyan water system, which has left nature 
relatively untouched and is inexpensive to maintain. In terms of costs, funds provided for the 
construction of the dam were embezzled by corrupt officials, unencumbered by rule of law 
enforcement. During project implementation, the resettlement of already disadvantaged 
populations exacerbated the housing and economic problems embattling the region, creating a 
new source of legitimacy threat. Economic performance legitimization strategy employed in the 
case of the Three Gorges Dam led to enormous social costs the central government has yet to 
fully pay.  
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Moral-Ideological Legitimization Reaction to Three Gorges Dam  
Following the massive, and very public, failure of the Three Gorges Dam, both the 
central government and the Chinese masses have become increasingly concerned about 
environmental development. For the CCP, the environment is a public arena by which the central 
government’s legitimacy is evaluated, for large infrastructure projects spearheaded by 
centralized leadership. Without local governments to blame, the onus is on the CCP to perform 
well in the environmental arena and create the impression that environmental matters are a top 
concern, especially for moral reasons. For the Chinese people, environmental project failure is 
just another signal that the CCP is not sufficiently committed to ensuring the environmental and 
food safety of the public.  
In particular, the mass incidents that have followed the construction of the Three Gorges 
dam has influenced the activities of the CCP. The former chief nuclear safety engineer of the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection, Yang Zhaofei, noted that soundly designed state-
sponsored projects with ample environmental protection provisions have been called off after 
“preventative” public protests (Fang, 2016). An insider using a pseudonym reported that the 18th 
National Party Congress considered a report on social stability as related to protests; shortly 
thereafter, the Ministry of Environmental Protection opened public access to environmental 
impact reports and the National Development and Reform Commission announced that 
feasibility studies for major projects would need to include a social stability assessment 
component (Fang, 2016). 
It is worth noting that the current government is particularly sensitive to threats to 
political stability poised by environmental protests. The Dongyang mass incident of 2005 as well 
as three other significant environmental protests occurred in the Zhejiang Province while Xi 
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Jinping was governor. During this time, he described environmental protests as capable of 
“[destroying] the fruits of reform and opening]” in a speech (Ma, 2009). Given Xi Jinping’s sour 
experience with environmental protests and his belief that protests threaten social stability, it is 
not hard to imagine his stance today.  
Given Xi Jinping’s prior experiences with environmental protests as well as the public 
failure of the Three Gorges Dam, the government has become much more proactive in 
responding to environmental complaints. After protestors opposed the construction of a slew of 
dams along the Nu Jiang11, the CCP silently began to retract its original plans. Without publicly 
referencing the Nu Jiang protests or announcing the closure of the 13 Nu Jiang dams, the CCP 
stopped construction in the project areas, which was only discovered after reporters visited build 
sites to find zero activity (Leavenworth, 2016). Though officials refused to discuss Nu Jiang 
plans, and the projects are still listed as a hydropower based in the national five-year plan, subtle 
signs – particularly talk of vegetation restoration and a possible national park – signal that the 
government has heard public protest full well (Jing, 2016). 
The central government’s augmented responsiveness to criticism – though falling short of 
acknowledgment – further affirms the presence of a socially-minded moral legitimization 
strategy. As public concern enveloping environmental and food safety augments, the CCP is 
likely to continue its policy responsiveness. To align the current CCP with the interest of the 
Chinese people, the central government has silently taken steps to distance the current 
administration from prior administrations. At an anniversary ceremony of the Three Gorges Dam 
project, not a single central government official was present. As a testament to the government’s 
commitment to greater responsiveness regarding social issues, the State Council in 2011 released 
a statement directly referring to the “urgent problems [that] must be resolved regarding the 
                                                          
11 The last undeveloped river in China.  
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smooth relocation of residents, ecological protection and geological disaster prevention” (Wines, 
2011). Another official criticized the dam construction process, accusing the planners of 
improperly accounting for the dam’s impact on surrounding water bodies (Wong, 2011). Though 
the CCP demonstrated a social consciousness regarding issues of environmental importance, the 
CCP’s well-received “transparency” may well be a cleverly disguised effort to distance itself 






Established on the battleground, it is no wonder the CCP, given its revolutionary roots, 
adopts a highly reactionary approach to legitimization. The policy dogmas that appeared post-
Mao are distinctively issue oriented. Policies are made in response to the perceived priorities of 
the era. For example, Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents” responds to the incorporation of the 
previously “bourgeoisie sympathizer” entrepreneurs in the 1990s while Hu Jintao’s “Scientific 
Development” was a response to “bridging the rich/poor gap in the 2000s” (Cao, 2014, p.10).  
With an established pattern of reactionary legitimization, it would come as no surprise 
with the cycle repeated itself again when the moral-legitimization strategy of the CCP churns out 
a new set of legitimacy challenges. Perhaps, the threat facing the CCP will be that of the call for 
democracy given its increased emphasis on governmental responsiveness. Perhaps, the appeal to 
nationalism may backfire, causing populist nationalists to call for war.  
If Xi Jinping’s moral-ideological legitimation strategy proves successful, the CCP may be 
able to defuse the ticking time bombs facing China’s economic and social status today. Under the 
guiding hand of Xi Jinping, the CCP is once again leaning towards ideological legitimation, with 
new, updated characteristics. Perhaps the most striking symbol of this legitimation cycle is the 
Chinese yuan. While currency is so often the symbol of capitalist wealth, Mao Zedong’s face 
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